(6.)

A

REPLY

TO

TWO PAMPHLETS,

IN ANSWER TO

"The Question, Why do we go to War?

erately discussed, according to the Official Correspondence:"

ONE ENTITLED

THE REASON WHY,

THE OTHER

OBSERVATIONS SUGGESTED, &c.

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A

REPLY, &c.

HAD the author of "The Reason Why?" confined himself, like the gentleman who writes the "Observations," to arguments alone, whatever might have been my opinion of their validity, I should not have been desirous of again bringing forward the question of the causes of the war: a question that is in a great measure superseded by the more immediately interesting one of, How we are to obviate the difficulties of it? Satisfied with having done what I thought a duty, in pointing out objects, the pursuit of which are totally inadequate to the cost; having endeavoured to awaken reflexion, often rancour, and calm indignation; nor should I have been inclined to have treated with any thing but deserved contempt, the illiberal insinuations and incivility of language that seem to indicate the pen of the hireling. But that system so frequently adopted, of branding all who may happen to disapprove of certain measures of an administration, with disloyalty, disaffection, partiality to the French, &c. cannot be sufficiently reprobated.

I can venture to say, I am as little partial to the French, and as *loyal a sulject*, as the author of "The Reason Why," whoever he may be; how far I am an *expert disputant*, I will not aver.

Loth as I am however to enter the lists again upon a question that should admit of no dispute, unwilling as I feel to wield again the weapon of discussion, and wind my weary way amid the mazes of the Official Correspondence, that enchanted grove which, hew it and hack it as you will, must ever be productive of blood, this valorous knight, as if in the habit of provoking war, throws down his gauntlet with a taunt of such defiance, with a flourish so triumphant, that I cannot refrain from taking it up, to vindicate myself from the charges of *fallacy*, *inconsistency*, and *misrepresentation*.

If this champion have the valour, he certainly has not the courtesy of ancient heroism; but, introducing himself with a specimen of politeness of a more modern date, pronounces the "Question" asked by the author, whom he means to combat, viz. "Why do we go to war?" to be as absurd as "can well be put to the common sense of the "British Empire," p. 3.

There are not wanting in these kingdoms some who would readily agree, that the asking any question respecting a measure of the present administration, is absurd enough; but the one in agitation must be particularly so, being a question that nobody can answer: It is for Malta, says this man; another,

not

not willing to allow the sufficiency of that reason, affirms it is for the emancipation of Holland and Switzerland; another, it is to curb the insolence of the Chief Consul, and reduce the power of France: the last answer might raise a smile, if a smile could be raised on a subject so serious—Reducing the power of France by fortifying and inundating our capital!—The gentleman who is the author of the "Observations," complains "that the war has "no definite object." (p. 27.) *He* therefore certainly cannot answer the "Question," *so clear and unembarrassed, so broadly founded on common sense.*—"Reason Why," p. 4.

The writer of "Reason Why" would make it believed that the pamphlet of the "Question, &c." has just now made its appearance, and that the author till now has been *pondering* over the subject; to say truth, it takes no little time to ponder over the Official Correspondence: but the tract was written in June, and from accidental circumstances did not issue from the press till July, I believe towards the latter end; this answerer must have taken therefore above two months to *ponder* over the "Reason Why;" and *his brain* must have had some *rummage* to produce so elaborate a performance: it is however for the benefit of the *illiterate* (p. 4.): whether the *illiterate* will read or be benefited by the reading it, I will leave to the opinion of the writer.

He then explodes, with an overpowering *tirade* of *profound ignorance*—*inflexible scepticism*—and *willful misrepresentation*—in the next page, "Men are "so closely wedded to their own false systems, so "desirous of gaining proselytes to their absurdities, "that in their endeavours to represent things as they "wish them in reality to exist, &c. when unable to "convince by argument, they try to mislead by "subterfuge," ibid. I shall not notice—*French judge*, p. 18—or *French thief*, p. 30—but ask if this writer is to be told, invective is not argument, or abusive language good writing—or does he wish to lead to the suspicion of being a stipendiary retained, to exhibit the Author of the "Question" as a monster to the rabble, to raise the cry of Jacobin or Frenchman, to excite the vulgar hootings of the undiscerning multitude.

He accompanies the first quotation from the pamphlet, called the "Question, &c." with observing, "His humanity is excessively shocked, "that we should be so soon again involved in a "conflict, that has every appearance of being more "ferocious, more inveterate than the last, and "which of course, in his opinion, must inevitably "plunge us into the abyss." I fear indeed it may; but why this quotation is made is difficult to discover, unless to shew that the humanity of the writer of "The Reason Why," is not at all shocked, though he says, in the next paragraph, "he is as "averse from war as any man."

To

To justify the message of the 8th of March, in reply to the assertion in the pamphlet, "There were "but two frigates in the roads of Holland, and "three corvettes in the roads of Dunkirk," as declared by Buonaparte, which he does not deny, he asks, "Was she not (France) fitting out large ar- "maments at Helvoetsluys and Flushing? was she "inactive at Havre, Cherbourg, Brest, and Toulon? "had not the recruiting service been carried on "with unabating diligence, &c." p. 8.

Now, not to mention that France, as the Chief Consul affirmed, and as was sufficiently notorious, had comparatively no navy, that in such a situation it would have been wonderful if they had not been active in their ports, that whatever their activity was employed in, it has not been able to accomplish, in these seven months since the message, a degree of preparation adequate to the attempt of an invasion of this Country: let us see what this writer acknowledges himself, p. 45—"The departure of the "expedition to Louisiana, the termination of her "troubles in her colonies, the return of her West- "Indian fleet; these were all matters of importance; "nor *was she in other respects in a state of sufficient* "*preparation:* she was not yet *sufficiently recovered* "from the severe shocks she had sustained in the "course of the last war; she had also the re-esta- "blishment of her manufactures, the revival of "her commerce, and the *restoration of her navy* "*very much at heart.*"

Thus, then, is it acknowledged that the "French "were not sufficiently prepared," that they had too much on their hands, too much in their minds to prepare for the invasion of, or meditate a war upon this Country: yet was all England alarmed, all Europe electrified, by the message of the 8th of March. He goes on to say, "Although she had "afforded positive indications of her intentions to "renew hostilities, it was nearly as clear that her "design was to *wait till she had completed those* "*manifold* arrangements which would insure the "waging them with success, &c." *ibid.* What these positive indications are, is never made clearly evident, unless is meant the enemy's imagined designs upon Egypt: he might envy our trade; he might have looked for acquiescence in what we rejected with disdain; he might sometimes have been disrespectful in conduct and deportment; been guilty of ridiculous gasconade or idle vanity: but were the frantic discourses of an upstart, intoxicated with power, and giddy with the painful eminence of an unexpected situation, to be attended to with seriousness.

That the French wished to have waited till these grand objects were accomplished, there is not the smallest doubt; they were objects they had *much at heart*; why not then have enjoyed a little repose? Were such works to be completed in a day, in a month, or in a few years? When they were completed, it is by no means evident they would have

then proceeded to hostilities with this Country, if we had treated them with any symptoms of amity; if they had, I trust we should have been as well, perhaps better able to have opposed them than even now; have had more capacity of offending and annoying them, with some resuscitated continental ally to assist us, if ever again we are to have such a thing as an ally. What is the result of our present policy in immediate war? we change his political views, turn his thoughts from commerce, from his colonies, from his navy; turn them from the arts of peace, turn them again to arms, convert his *subjects* to a nation of soldiers, of barbarian ravagers, whom he sends to pillage the neighbouring territories, and avenge him on the prostrate nations of Europe, while he keeps us in a state of constant uneasy tension, with the eternal threat of invasion, which he may or may not execute, as whim, desperation, or opportunity may prompt. Has he not done exactly what he said he would, and what was natural he should do, as soon as war was determined upon; that is, seize, plunder, and devastate Hanover, possess himself entirely of Holland, overrun Italy, &c. while he keeps us in a state of alarming suspense, by preparations for invasion; Did our government weigh well these consequences? They may have good and deep designs to get us out of this dilemma, and I hope they have, for there are no means apparent but the chapter of accidents and chance of the die; and why not wait for these under

less uneasy circumstances. The peace-establishment of our army and marine was fully sufficient to guard us against any surprize we might fancy ourselves liable to. I have treated this subject further in the former publication: shall therefore proceed to the wearisome task of going over once more the different charges.

I. The confiscation of the merchant ships.

I have called this the heaviest, and so I think it; but I am accused by both my opponents of still not giving full weight and measure enough; and having neglected to notice the British property that was not restored.

If they mean, because we paid foreigners after the peace the full interest of their money in our funds, as the subjects of England were paid, the English, who were foreigners in France, should have received more than was paid by the French government to their own subjects, I do not see the reasonableness of the expectation: the French lost, I believe, two thirds of their property in their own funds; the English proprietors, therefore, could expect no less than to share the same fate.

Their refusal to trade with us I have called a blind and pitiful policy, which would have corrected itself. I believe it is not unknown, that while the Chief Consul prohibited the entry of our goods in general into the ports of France, he gave a licence or privilege to his favourites for the importation of them, so desirous were they of English manufactures: this

must

must soon have brought about the reciprocal advantage of a commercial intercourse.

There is another circumstance respecting money concerns that seems to have slid out of notice, viz. the sums, which are very considerable, due according to the second article of the treaty of Amiens for the sustenance and maintenance of French prisoners, there was of course a large balance in favour of this country. We never hear that this has been demanded, the demand might perhaps be useless enough in the present condition of the French finances; but if we had been determined upon war, this circumstance, added to the neglect of redress in the confiscation of our ships, might have made a tolerable ground for it, the best that could have been selected from all the charges: so much more weight will I throw in for the gratification of the answerers.

The gentleman of the "Observations", may say, this proves the "pacific disposition" of our ministers; I grant it, and should applaud, had such disposition been adhered to; but the misfortune is, I fear they seem to have been pacific where they should have been hostile, and hostile where they should have been pacific: have been wavering and doubtful respecting peace or war, decided upon war, and stumbled at last on the very worst ground for it—reminding us of the words put by Metastasio into the mouth of the Emperor Adrian

Tutto accordar vorrei—scelgo, mi pento ;
Poi d'essermi pentito, mi ritorno a pentir ;
. . . . . Al fin mi veggio
*Stretto dal tempo, e mi risolvo al peggio.**

Adriano in Siria.

The author of the "Reason Why," says : "The "French acted neither the part of a friend, or of "neutral, but of a foe." (p. 6.) If they really acted like a foe, why not treat them like a foe at once? Why should parliament be told at the end of November, 1802, "There was no reason to look upon "the peace as not permanent; that we were in "a profound state of peace."

If government was *not satisfied*, there is little or nothing concerning it in the Correspondence: all Mr. Merry's letters are dated before November, 1802—at least before the meeting of parliament. Lord Whitworth, merely in conversation, complains to the Chief Consul of the difficulty of obtaining justice respecting British property detained; to which he replies: "This must be attributed to the "natural difficulties attendant on such suits, when "both parties think themselves in the right; but "he denied that such delays could proceed from any "disinclination to do what was just or right." *So much for the first charge.*

Respecting

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* I give up all—decide, and then repent;
And then repent of having so decided;
At length decide upon the worst of measures.

Respecting the second, the Commercial Agents :— The author of the "Reason Why," quotes the instructions complained of (Inst. 11 and 12), concerning the plans of our ports, and allows they might have been purchased at any good mapseller's shop; why then bring them forward in italics in the Official Correspondence: He complains, as does also the author of "Observations," that they were military men. All men in office in France are military men: it is a military government; every thing is military: Are not all their envoys and ambassadors, generals and military men?

He argues, the French "acquiesced in their "dismissal" (Reason Why, p. 14.); that "the "excuse they made was an unmanly prevarication, "or barefaced falsehood" (p. 15.) Surely then thi was debasement sufficient: if they degraded themselves by prevarication and falsehood, how are we degraded and insulted?

As to the question asked by the author of "Observations" about projects on commercial subjects, the writer of "Reason Why" has answered it, and given us a piece of secret information, that not only M. Otto's *conciliatory* letter (p. 15.), but "several other corresponding propositions respecting "trade, were certainly presented by the French "government; but when the English government "shewed a serious disposition to come to a defi- "nitive settlement, insurmountable objects were "instantly stated by France, and some fresh cause "of delay interposed."

We

We will take this writer's word for the truth of this; but why not tell it us before? Why let us have M. Otto's *conciliatory* letter now printed in italics to mark suspicion; there was at least no insult, no affront, in this letter; it was respectful, and amicable (Official Correspondence, P. 2, p. 212.)

By the manner of both these writers, one would imagine, I had approved of these commissaries, and that it was my opinion, they ought to have been received. I perfectly approve of our conduct in their dismissal; but by no means, when they had been dismissed and taken quietly back again, even with shame and disgrace, that the subject should again be adduced as a reason for going to war.

The same may be said of the third charge, in which, as to the propriety and humanity of continuing shelter to the *Emigré*'s, we are all three agreed, though I am admitted, unwillingly, to join the trio: one says, I am *compelled*, "Observations," p. 7; the other, "Reason Why," p. 15, that "it "was the least important one, and because it *is* "the least important, I allow we acted with man-"liness and humanity," in refusing to comply; "that the point was not, as I state, immediately "abandoned; it was *repeatedly* urged by the French, "and as *repeatedly* rejected by us." It seems, however, to have been but once officially and formally urged, according to the official papers at least, "Official Correspondence," p. 39. It was, as well as

as the solicitation, not to be abused, then urged, then refused, and afterwards urged no more.

Respecting the fourth article, concerning the liberty of the press, a few further observations may be necessary.

It is stated, that "The French government *repeatedly* urged, that the laws and constitution of "this country should be changed relative to the li-"berty of the press." I own I cannot conceive how the requisition made by the French, to suppress our scandalous abuse of them in our public papers and writings, can possibly, by any contortion, be wrested into a demand to alter our laws and constitution. Let any reasonable and impartial man read the note of M. Otto (No. 12, Official Correspondence) referred to by the author of the "Reason Why," and say if he can find any thing but the most serious, just, and rational complaint. I would quote from it, but must quote it all, and it is too long; must beg the reader, therefore, if he would pursue the subject, to refer to it. This note ends in officially soliciting his Majesty's government, "to adopt the most effectual measures to put "a stop to the unbecoming and seditious publi-"cations, &c."

I have said, we refused to comply. "The French "are silent, and mention the subject no more;" upon which the author of the "Reason Why" exclaims, "What are we to think of the candour of "our author, when, on referring to the Official "Correspondence,

" Correspondence, we discover, that even in the " very document, he has *ventured* to quote, M. " Otto, the humble M. Otto, represents the matter " as a very serious offence." (Official Correspondence, No. 12.) This is the very paper I wish to refer to; as to its not being mentioned more, there was certainly no farther solicitation or demand made. Let us just see what is said in the "French Official Correspondence," p. 122. " This " note (meaning M. Otto's requisition not to be " farther abused) received no official answer; the " British ministry contented themselves with sta- " ting, that they would cause satisfactory explanations to be made at Paris; but though this was " promised, nothing was performed. The periodical papers, in the French language, were encouraged and circulated with additional profusion; the plots and intrigues went on: persuaded " at last, that this proceeded, not from omission, " but from system, on the part of the British government, the French government sacrificed to " peace, the resentment which these wretched libels " occasioned, and no *farther mention* was made of " them. Accordingly, from the month of Thermidor (August), year 10, there was in the inter- " course, between the two governments, no mutual " complaint, nor any *exchange of official document.*"

It was in conversation mentioned by Talleyrand, and the Chief Consul did certainly declare, during the discussions, that, " to *preserve peace*, the abuse in the

" public

" public prints must, if not totally suppressed, " at least be kept *within bounds*." (Reason Why, p. 22.) Now, I own I do not think this a very unreasonable request, or a very dear purchase of peace, especially, as even the author of the " Observations" candidly allows, " It cannot be denied that our periodical papers indulged, in a degree of invective, " which even the accumulated atrocities of the Consular government could scarcely justify; a system of abuse was adopted by most of them so very gross, as to defeat the end of the writers, &c." (p. 10.) Was this, I will again ask, consistent with the first article of the treaty of peace? Was it carefully avoiding every thing which might hereafter affect the union happily re-established between the two nations" (Treaty of Amiens, art. 1.) Nor can I wonder that General Andreossi noticed *the speeches of some leading members of parliament*. Were there not members of parliament, who, from the time of the signing the treaty, never ceased to vilify it, call it the disgrace, the ruin of the country, appeared bellowing for blood, and clamorous for war? When our enemy has expressed his desire only, that this abuse should at least *be kept within bounds*, I do not see that he can well be accused of expecting " these unpalatable publications should be stopped, by secret examination, secret imprisonment, *secret torture, and secret death*." (Reason Why, p. 19.)

" After

" After what our author terms a re-examination " of the three last charges (proceeds the writer of the " Reason Why,") he comes to the fifth." I do not wonder he should slink from this re-examination, since it places, I trust, in a forcible point of view, what will appear an extraordinary incident in the records of history. We have heard of nations making demands on other nations, and on refusal, going to war; but it is surely a new reverse of things for the refusing nation to allege the demands as reasons for waging war. Had France in the giddiness of power, and pride of conquest, demanded twenty of our line-of-battle ships, we should have spurned at the idea, and given, I trust, an answer fraught with the sharpness, spirit, and contempt, the insolence the demand deserved; but I hold it not politic or necessary to have gone to war with them.

What has the enemy in this case demanded? Conceiving the residence of the exiled princes in this country to be too near and dangerous to his peace, imagining they might be plotting schemes for their restoration, and plans for the subversion of the new establishments, *solicits* us to *recommend* (Official Correspondence, No. 12) to them to retire to a more distant dwelling. We reject the proposal, and say, we will not refuse them shelter as long as they are peaceable and harmless.

He solicits us, since we have ceased hostilities with the sword, to cease hostilities with the tongue

and

nd with the pen; but we refuse to keep our abuse ven *within bounds*. (Reason Why, p. 22). And tell im—*He may go to law.**

As to the commissaries, we kick them out of the ountry—and will not every reasonable Englishman e satisfied? Will not my spirited and high-minded riend, if he will allow me so to call him, the gen-leman of the "Observations," be content? Must ve go to war, because we have refused compliance? Must we ever answer with a lion's roar, and give our egative through the cannon's mouth? Are we so nsulted beyond what we can bear, that there is no emedy but war? Were we that abject and that umble thing there is so much pains to make us elieve we are, or likely to become? were we one f those "pusillanimous and dastardly nations "blotted from the map of Europe," (Reason Why, p. 58); would he not assume a far other tone, would he not imperiously command, and say, Send away he Bourbons, cease your abuse, or I will chastise ou with my vengeance, with fines and devastation; hould we have ventured on dismissal of the com-nissaries? We further tell him, "You have had 'the impudence to publish an impertinent and 'daring manifesto, an injurious libel in the Ham-'burgh Gazette." He replies, I beg pardon, it is really a mistake; it was not with my consent,

 with

* Vide "Reason Why," p. 20, and Lord Hawkesbury's Letter. (Official Correspondence.)

with my knowledge.* We tell him he lies †, and *attempt* to knock him down. We say again, you have had the insolence to declare we cannot "fight you single-handed."—Audacious boaster! we will put it to the test, is our reply. But are we in a condition, is Europe in a situation to warrant this high language? Is it for considerations such as these, on motives so inadequete, that two nations, wearied with war and panting for repose, are again to meet in undeterminable conflict, to fall again to slaughter, to be hallooed together like bull-dogs, to worrie and to tear, till one lie prostrate at the victor's feet? Are Great-Britain and France the two most potent nations of Europe, like two the stoutest of the forest-herd, to butt and goad one another, while the rest look on in selfish hope of their being wounded and weakened till on a level with themselves, or are they to fight like Gladiators, for the amusement of the surrounding world, who, sitting in the colossal amphitheatre, wait with a Roman eagerness to ap-

plaud

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* Lord Whitworth sent word, in his Letter to Lord Hawkesbury (No. 57, Official Correspondence), that Talleyrand assured him, his Majesty's Ministers could not be more surprised than the Chief Consul had been at the insertion of the article, that an explanation would be required of M. Rheinhardt; in the mean time, Lord Whitworth might inform Lord Hawkesbury it was *completely disavowed*.

† The producing the manifesto after it had been so officially disavowed, as a reason for going to war, is tantamount to this language.

ud the prowess of the conqueror, and feast upon
dying agonies of the vanquished.

If I have endeavoured to sooth the rage, to smooth
animosity of these fierce combatants; to shew
ere honour is not wounded, where insult does
reach—am I to be branded with the accusation
artifice, industrious mischief, and wilful misre-
sentation?

Our words and our actions are nearly on a similar
ain respecting the seventh charge of aggrandise-
nt; a strain that, in "other, and in better times,"
allow, might be admissible, might be politic,
ght be necessary; but in the circumstances of
s country, in the lost and degraded state of the
ropean nations, trembling, enervated, and resist-
s; when the political balance has been so shaken
m its *fulcrum*, that it can never resume its former
uilibrium, is a machine laid aside, broken and
less? Is it a time for us to speak to that gigantic
nius of overwhelming usurpation, which, like a
rkening cloud (I hope a passing storm) oppresses
d obscures the universe, in language like the fol-
wing:—You have encroached upon Switzerland,
d broken your treaty with the Emperor of Ger-
any; you have not provided for the King of Sar-
nia, and broken your engagement with the Em-
ror of Russia; you have not fulfilled your agree-
ent with the Batavians; and have annexed Pied-
ont to France, made an agreement about Parma,
hich you kept secret from us.

While the two great Emperors are silent, the Batavian afraid to speak, Piedmont and Rome suffering no more than they expected, are we to command this power to fulfil his treaties with the Emperors, and his engagements with the Dutch? Are we, is this little island, to carve out empires for the world? Shall we do it—can we do it—are we likely to do it? Is it not idle, useless, vain boasting? Do we not feel the effects of it? After such a treaty as that at Amiens, not that I mean to enter into the merits of that treaty farther than to shew, that after being sensible of the necessity of such a treaty, after giving up all our acquisitions, all hold we could have upon France—after a declaration from the mouth of the minister—"that all hopes of continental aid were at "an end, that it was in vain any longer to think of "reducing the power of France, that another cam- "paign, the *most successful* campaign, would never "compensate the £40,000,000 it must cost."* Surely the holding out the language, or acting upon the ideas I have stated above, is an inconsistency and contradiction most glaring. And will the author of the "Reason Why" pretend, or can the gentlemen of the "Observations" affect to wonder, that I should ask—"Was the situation of Europe essentially dif- "ferent at the time of the message, in March 1803, "from what it was at the signing the treaty of "Amiens, March 1802. Was not Piedmont his "own

* Vide Parliamentary Register.

" own," &c. *It cannot be from ignorance* that he doubts it, if he has attended to the declaration of the minister, or the real and true situation of Europe—that Europe he had conquered, that world that was his own.

The writer of " Reason Why" answers—" *it* " *essentially* was—Piedmont was annexed," &c. I should be glad to know what their ideas of *possession* can possibly be: if there is a country where a potentate can appoint officers, change the magistracy and govenment at will, from whence he can draw military and pecuniary resources at pleasure, I should deem that country in the absolute possession and power of that potentate; can it signify whether it is called part of Italy, part of Germany, or part of France? I will maintain, notwithstanding the cavil of the writer of the " Reason Why," that if a stout thief, whether English, German, or *French thief* (according to the ingenious thought and liberal insinuation of that writer), with a pistol at your temple, has taken your purse, whether he chooses to dangle it in his fingers or put it in his pocket, it is of little consequence; he has effectually got the purse, and the man must be a fool, who, in such a situation, having thrown away his arms, and left himself helpless, would get his brains blown out in a fruitless attempt to regain it.

The author of the " Observations," p. 15, asks, if Spain is not now as much the " Consul's own" as Piedmont was at signing the " Treaty of Amiens," &c. I answer, not quite so much so; though I still

consider Spain as little more than a province of France: the author himself calls Spain the vassal of France. (P. 17.)

The seizure of Switzerland, though much to be lamented, I have shown, in the former pamphlet, is of no political detriment; rather an advantage to us.

We might, perhaps, have *supposed* (p. 30,) that the agreement made with Holland would have been adhered to, and the country evacuated by the French troops: the evacuation was delayed, it might have taken place; the armaments designed for the expedition to Louisiana and St. Domingo might have embarked for their places of destination had transports been ready, *but which were not*: We were desired not to interfere (*Vid.* Mr. Liston's Letter); we have interfered; that is, we have gone to war, and made Holland a province to France.

"Are all these disappointments, all these aggres-
"sions, says the author of "Reason Why," all these
"scandalous infractions of the most sacred pledges,
"by which one nation can bind itself to another,
"mere matters of indifference."

I do not say they are, but I say how can we help it? And are all these aggressions against us? Are we to take all the aggressions against Austria, Russia, Switzerland, Italy, upon ourselves? Is not the outrage of infinitely more consequence to the continental powers, whose dominions he can in a moment overwhelm with his armies, than to us in our sea-girt island, so difficult of access?

"In

" In the good times of Europe (he goes on) " any one of these acts would have roused every " other state to arms, and have cemented a general " league for the repression and chastisement of such " iniquitous proceedings; and because other states " have meanly shrunk from their duty, is a power- " ful, an honourable, a valiant, and an independent " nation, like Britain, to follow their retrograde and " and cowardly footsteps ?"

Britain may be a powerful, an honourable, a valiant, and an independent nation; but it is a very foolish nation, if it is thus to fight the battles of the whole world.

" If we submit to be told," says the Author of " Observations," p. 25, " that we shall not inter- " fere with the affairs of civilized Europe, that we " we must remain spectators alone of its affairs, and " neither lament (we may lament them surely at " least), nor avenge their wrongs; if we are told that " the Great Consul of the Great Nation is offended " with our press, our parliamentary freedom, our " hospitality to the distressed, and we *submit even* " *to hear* such language—we are degraded, we are " lost, if we deliberate—

" The Nation that deliberates is lost."

" There is no remedy but immediate war," the Author is very sorry, he laments it—but there is no remedy, but the calamities of war; he must " acquiesce in the least of evils," a war whose " object is indefinite," Observations, p. 27; that

is, which has no object at all; a war that has another *singular* objection—" the issue is doubtful"—*ibid.*

Let us contrast this voice of *high-toned dignity*, this assumed pre-eminence suited to those other and those better times, with fact, with what might be expected, what is really effected by going to war.

We have caused the seizure and devastation of Hanover; Holland to be confirmed a province of France; Switzerland to be bound still closer, and more forcibly in chains; Italy to be overrun; while we ourselves (I had almost said), are trembling for the safety of our capital, the security of our island. Thus do we check the aggrandisement complained of: thus do we vindicate the cause of Europe, perhaps arrogate her thanks, for standing forth her champion, challenging her gigantic foe to single combat, and proving to the world how well we can *defend* ourselves.

Still therefore may the question be asked, Why do we go to War? or rather now, Why did we go to War?

The only remaining cause alleged, is Malta, allowed " To be at least one of the most prominent " causes of the present war." " Reason Why," p. 32.

'Tis then for Malta, not the perpetuity of Malta, a *secret* agreement for a ten-years lease of Malta; I will ask, on the first *blush* of the question, is this an adequate cause, is this a cause to draw down upon the nation, wearied as it is, the calamity of war, a cause worth submitting to that tremendous experiment

ment, that doubtful issue; is it worth the £40,000,000 which one year's campaign alone, the most *successful* campaign would cost? That it is not an adequate object, the Author of "Observations" must allow, or rather that it is no object at all, having declared, p. 27, there is no definite one to the war. Ministers must confess, it is at least a light cause, since they are under the necessity of adding seven or eight others to make it of sufficient weight; are we then to break our faith, sully our honour, blast our fame in the eyes of Europe, risk our existence for no object, or at least a light one?

The author of the "Reason Why" p. 60, states the subject at issue thus:—"He (meaning the writer of the pamphlet "Why do we go to war?") says: "We have broken our faith respecting Malta: "I say we have not—and here we are at issue. But "*he* has the *whimsies* of his own brain to refer "to; *I* am supported by the incontrovertible evi- "dence of facts and the treaty." That firm, that solid, that substantial ally the Treaty—And do *I* stand alone in this opinion?—is this whimsy but in *my* brain alone?—Is this boasted Treaty so clear and so intelligible to all the world, that *I* alone find difficulty in comprehending it—I believe not.—It is at best then a doubtful case: if it is impolitic in a nation to go to war without the most pressing necessity, a proposition uncontroverted, it must be most impolitic to go to war upon unjust and unnecessary grounds, and nearly as much so on

doubtful

doubtful and equivocal ones. If the breach of faith concerning Malta should not be palpable to all, it certainly is to many; and that *doubtfulness* is sufficient to substantiate the obvious impolicy at least.

I will not fatigue the reader by too minutely following the author of "the Reason Why" through his laboured attempt to clear up this doubt, or trace him through every sinuosity of the tortuous argument, but tread upon the broad and obvious ground —the point relating to the guarantees.

After enumerating the several paragraphs or stipulations of the 10th Art. of the Treaty of Amiens, upon my observation on paragraph 4, viz. "The "forces of his Britannic Majesty shall evacuate the "island, *provided* the Grand Master, &c. shall be "ready to receive possession, &c." upon my observation that this is the only provisional clause, he asks "because it is the only provisional one," is it the only obligatory one?—I answer certainly not; nothing farther is advanced than that it is the only provisional one; the rest are certainly obligatory; they are arrangements which each party obliges itself to agree to, respecting the future situation of the island of Malta; it is agreed by the fourth paragraph, that the British troops shall give up the Island to the Order, *provided* a Grand Master is chosen and ready to receive the resignation (which was the case); but not *provided* the powers *agreed* upon to be nominated as guardians of the treaty, are willing

willing to undertake the guardianship. The fixth paragraph, which concerns the guarantees, runs in these words: "The independence of the islands, Malta, "&c. shall be under the protection and guarantee "Great Britain, France, Russia, Prussia," &c. which can mean nothing but that we the high contracting parties agree to choose and appoint these powers to undertake the guardianship and protection of this island and this treaty, provided (which must of course be understood), they are willing to undertake it:—and in the 13th and last paragraph it is agreed that they shall be invited, that is, applied to for their consent so to do.

As this was so material a point, does not every man of common sense, after a perusal of the last paragraph of this tenth article, expect to read, and actually read by anticipation in his own mind—in case all or any of the within-named guarantees shall refuse to accept such guaranty, then—something should follow: but no provision following, is the non-acceptance to effect the execution of the treaty and evacuation of the island, are we to finish the supposed condition by—then this agreement to be null and void? Will the other contracting party permit such a construction? Was it never supposed that these powers would refuse? Was it never imagined that one of the principal guarantees would not accept the *invitation* when the clause in the third paragraph, that establishes a Maltese Knight, without

without proof of nobility, was known * to be particularly offensive to him: and shall we affirm that the non-acceptance of the guaranty should annul the treaty? If such acceptance was a *sine quâ non* of the execution of the agreement, Why was it signed?

To my "*shall be!*" What, whether they will or not? (p. 37.) it is simply answered, "*The inquiry was never made*; "but the French who were par- "ties as well as ourselves, were in *close intelligence* "with several of the proposed guarantees, and had "better opportunities than we of learning their sen- "timents."

Yet the inquiry was never made—in all the five months from November to the end of March, that Lord Cornwallis was in France, to conclude the treaty, these powers, it should seem, were never sent to—their assent to so *principal a condition of the treaty*, p. 39, never once asked—yet the treaty was signed!

Was this omission meant to be a loop for the cruel purpose of hanging doubt and contention upon?

Was

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* The proof that this was known at the time of concluding the treaty of Amiens, is in Count Worowzow's Letter, November 12, 1802, which should precede No. 34, Official Correspondence; but which was suppressed, and is only to be found in the French Official Correspondence, p. 163. In this letter, the Emperor of Russia proposed a convention to settle the business of Malta.

Was not then the signing the treaty a mere mummery a mockery, a fooling of the country and the world,* with the vain phantom of a peace, which has like a phantom passed away—or is it all but a *whimsy of the brain*, p. 60, the mere delusion of an idle dream !

After all that has been said about this tenth article—all the disputes whether it is or is not a breach of faith on our part, it is somewhat curious to look into the protocol, and read immediately preceding the articles of the treaty—"It is of great "importance to both nations, and indeed to all "Europe, to fix on a plan of arrangement for that "island (Malta) that may have *nothing uncertain* "about its future state. It is according to this "principle that the British government acts ; a "principle which must arise from its desire to "remove every cause of *misunderstanding in future* "between itself and the French government."—French Official Correspondence, p. 125.

Can it be imagined that the execution of a treaty drawn up under such protestations, upon such principles, should be left to depend upon a contingency ; upon

* The author of a late able and celebrated pamphlet asserts, that those who "confided in the duration of the peace of Amiens, "must be *drivellers*," Mr. Addington did not make fo ls of them ; they were ready made to his hands!!! — Cursory Remarks, p. 38.—This, under the air of a compliment, conveys the severest censure on the Minister.

upon whether the guarantees would or would not accept the invitation to the guaranteeship? Must it not have been understood by the contracting parties that the fourth paragraph of the tenth article was to be fulfilled, and the island evacuated by the English, whether all or any of the powers chosen would consent, or whether all or any would refuse to undertake the protection of the independence of the island.

The opinion, which the other contracting party to this agreement held respecting the stipulations concerning Malta, may be seen in Andreossi's Letter (French Official Correspondence, p. 125). "What can be alleged in justification of the delay "in evacuating Malta? Has not the tenth article "of the treaty of Amiens provided for every thing? "and the Neapolitan troops being arrived, under "what pretext do those of England still remain there? "Is it because all the powers enumerated in the "sixth paragraph have not yet accepted the gua- "rantee which is devolved on them? But this is "*not a condition that relates to the evacuation of the* "*island*. The British troops, according to the "*express conditions* of the treaty are to evacuate the "island of Malta, placing it under the guard of the "Neapolitans; who are to garrison it, until the "definitive arrangements of the Order are settled.

"It should therefore seem impossible, and it "would be without example in the history of "nations, were Britain to refuse to execute a funda-

"mental

mental article of the pacification, of the very one, which in the drawing up of the preliminaries was considered as the first, and as requiring to be settled previously to any other point."

The treaty of Amiens has been sometimes termed an experiment of peace," fatal and costly experiment; were I to set down in detailed catalogue the places surrendered to pay this cost, they would nearly fill a page, and the sight of a Noble Marquis* might be offended, did he chance to cast his eyes upon it.

I can only say, it reminds me of those experiments have read of, that were made by some ingenious philosophers upon their own persons, one nearly put his eyes out by squeezing them, in order to examine those luminous rings, visible on the pressure of that organ, another, in trying the effect of camphor internally on the human frame, was thrown into convulsions from which he, with some difficulty, recovered. I hope we also shall recover from convulsions, should our experiment unfortunately occasion any.

If

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* The gallant soldier, Lord Cornwallis, could not help being struck with the resignation of so many acquisitions, and demanded "Why the French government in its counter-projet of treaty *affectedly* detailed all the restitutions which were to be the result of peace?" that they might not be offensive, they were afterwards *lumped*. — (French Official Correspondence, p. 72).

If the peace of Amiens was an experiment only, and not absolutely necessary for this country, nothing can be more evident than that, it *never* should have been made. If it was not an experiment but really necessary, which I rather believe was the case, it never should *so soon* and *upon such grounds* have been broken.

The Author of " Reason Why," p. 38, thinks it *worthy of remark* that the word *invited* made use of in the 13th paragraph, is likewise used respecting the Knights and the King of Naples, and *sagaciously* observes, " We were no surer of the invited Knights " than we were of the invited guarantees." I think we were a great deal surer. The restoration of the Knights was the object of the Treaty; had they refused to accept the island, it would certainly have made a great difference; had the Chief Consul proposed to restore to the King of Sardinia, Piedmont and Savoy, and the King had refused to accept such proposal, which would have been a little extraordinary, the Chief Consul might have kept them with a better grace. There are too sorts of invitations, an invitation to a good thing, and an invitation to a bad one; there is likewise a vulgar adage, " The end of a " feast is better than the beginning of a fray :" Now the Knights were *invited* to feast upon what remained of their property, and pick that *bone of contention*, the island of Malta : the guarantees were *invited* to run great risk of beginning a *fray*, by agreeing to defend

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he Island against any attack from either of the con-racting and inviting parties: it is no wonder, therefore, nat they should feel a little shy of such an engage-nent.

The writer boasts (p. 41) that Talleyrand differed nuch from the "opinion of our Author," and allowed ve had a justifiable pretext for the retention of Malta p to January 1803; and appeals "to candour and justice, whether any blame can attach up to that period." Let us see what Lord Whitworth says in he very letter referred to by this writer (Official orrespondence, Number 35): "Talleyrand, with *great solemnity*, required to be informed, and that by the *express orders* of the First Consul, what were his Majesty's intentions with regard to the evacuation of Malta, that the guarantees were now ready to come forward, except Russia, without whom the guaranty would be equally complete, and that consequently Great Britain would have *no pretext for keeping longer possession.*"

Is this conversation then, that charges us with eeping possession of Malta *under pretext*, and seems o demand how much longer we mean to make such ain pretences, in the name of *candour and of justice*, be called allowing "*a justifiable pretext which would soon be removed*," and will this writer charge e author of the pamphlet with *fallacy* and *misrepre-ntation?* They never ceased to demand the cession Malta, and accomplishment of the Treaty.

"About this time (January 1803), the * pro-
"visional accession of the Emperor of Russia
"arrived:" (p. 41 "Reason Why,") it was
"unfortunately what we could not consent to, as the
"main purport was to abolish the Maltese langue,
"and injure the privileges of the Maltese, whom we
"were bound to protect", &c. With much parade this protection is vaunted, and "*the Champion of* "*France, in his fatal zeal to serve her*, is accused of "being thrown into a heap of inconsistences, among "which he totally loses himself; one moment re-"proaching us with abandoning the Maltese, the "next for advocating their cause," p. 42. But these are the very inconsistences in which *the Champion* is not lost, but which he means to blame. The Maltese inhabitants whom we were "in honour bound to "protect," to whom in fact we were chiefly obliged for the possession of the Island, had reason to expect, that at the peace the island would be given up to them, instead of which, we agree to deliver it up to the Knights, whom they abhorred. Some few privileges are reserved, however, to the inhabitants; but we choose for a guarantee a power to whom we know that those privileges are obnoxious; then refuse

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* The letter suppressed in the Official Correspondence, proposing a convention to revise and differently arrange the 10th article of the Treaty.

to fulfil the Treaty, because that power will not accept the guaranteeship, though the Treaty might be completed as well without that power, and the rights stipulated for the Maltese undisputed and preserved. In our ultimatum we endeavoured to place the island in the hands of the inhabitants, and abolish the Order. So we first abandoned the Maltese in favour of the Order, then wish to abandon the Order in favour of the Maltese.

I will not however go deeper into the dispute about the Maltese inhabitants, their sending deputies to London, or the Russian guarantee; for now "all further proceedings are stopped, the visible "position of circumstances reversed, and we have "declared a resolution not to evacuate Malta till "an adequate security is placed in our heads," p. 43. What is it? What phænomenon in nature can it be, that thus suddenly stops all proceeding, reverses the position of the world, and makes us declare, Malta we have got, and Malta we will keep? Why nothing less than the notable report of Colonel Sebastiani! that rhodomontade, allowed by my other opponent, the author of "Observations," which "showed the folly of the writer, and the detestation "with which the name of Frenchman was held in "Egypt, by proving that France wished still to "have partizans in that country, "Observations," p. 18; but which, according to the author of "Reason Why," was an outrage and aggression on the "part of France, treated by me with unbecoming

" levity, but, *fortunately* for the country, con-
" templated by government with more appropriate
" feeling," p. 43. In short, it was among those
" provocations, those reproaches, and those en-
" croachments, that it would not only place Malta,
" but *England*, at the disposal of France!" p. 44.
So, by giving up Malta, we give up England!!
I have detailed more at large this report in the former publication, or it may be read in the appendix to the Official Correspondence; when it is read, I would then ask, if instead of " resentment" (Reason Why, p. 44), it should not have excited contempt; whether there was any thing " to awaken new suspicion?" or any " explanation" worth demanding?

Suspicion must have been unaccountably lulled respecting the intentions of the First Consul in regard to Egypt, if it needed such a report as this to awaken it. Could it be forgotten, or not thought of, that it was an old and favorite idea, a design that, if he lived, he would one day or other attempt again to execute; but was there any thing in the report that tended to facilitate the more immediate execution of it? He did not wish to conceal such designs; he told Lord Whitworth, and he told him true, that " sooner or later he should be in the possession of " Egypt." We may by precaution, sacrifices, and exertions, make it *later*; but those exertions will certainly cost this country much more than the object is worth. Talleyrand might likely enough choose to boast of the magnitude and consequence

of

of the possession of such a country as Egypt, and would be pleased to excite, and to laugh at the jealousy we felt respecting our Indian possessions, p. 50. Lord Whitworth observed, it was " with an *affected tone of candour*."—Official Correspondence, No. 37.

Whatever the designs of the Chief Consul were upon Egypt, there is no doubt but the execution of them must have been deferred to a very distant time. He had too much on his hands to think of such new and hazardous enterprises: by this very author's account (" Reason Why," p. 40). He had " objects of moment to accomplish," the troubles in the colonies to pacify, to recover from the shocks sustained during the last war, the re-establishment of manufactures, the revival of commerce, and restoration of his navy."

What might have happened before all these weighty matters could be accomplished, before any thing tending to preparation for so comprehensive a plan as the acquisition of Egypt, could take place,

> . . . . . How chances mock,
> And changes fill the cup of alteration
> With divers liquors. . . . . .

We were not willing to wait for, but, yielding to our hasty jealousy, and the irritation occasioned by the paper published in the Hamburgh Gazette " Reason Why," p. 52, precipitately resolve to keep Malta at any rate, though it is evident the Chief Consul

is equally determined we shall not, and that war must necessarily be the consequence. Is not Malta then the cause and object of the war? but a cause one cannot well wonder that we should often be ashamed to admit; that some compunction should be felt at the idea of the flame of war being again lighted up over Europe, because we insist upon retaining a rocky island in the Mediterranean, which we were under a solemn compact to resign.

If this country (begins the author of "Reason Why," p. 46), had been influenced by the councils, "and guided by the accommodating politics of our "author, we might, I grant, have remained a little "longer at peace, because we should have continued "yielding till we had nothing to yield." A very curious conclusion; because we yielded one thing, it follows we are to yield every thing, to have kept the faith of treaty, to have given up what we had pledged ourselves most solemnly so to do, would have been to have continued yielding till we had nothing left to yield! "The French might have seized the whole "of the continent; that, in our author's opinion, did "not concern us." It may concern us, but how can we help it? how *have* we helped it? Look at the situation of the Continent now, and at our own; let us not at least be laughed at. "They might have "gained possession of Malta, and of all the islands "in the Adriatic, the Archipelago, and the Medi-"terranean, they were not worth contending for." I echo, not worth contending for. They might have

got

got them, or they might not; but, granting that the chances were in favour of their getting them, it is certainly, at present, not worth our while to contend about them. "They might have conquered Egypt, and have added it indissolubly to their European empire;" they sooner or later in all probability will: we may struggle and fight, and exhaust ourselves in opposing them, but the plan, if pursued, must sooner or later succeed. It may be some half century before such an event takes place; but that it will take place at one time or other, there is every reason to believe. "Our fears, respecting any injury which "might arise from that quarter to our Indian pos-"sessions, were perfectly preposterous." I repeat perfectly preposterous. My other opponent, the gentleman of the "Observations," seems of the same opinion. "I am convinced the danger to our "Eastern possessions, from the Republic of France "occupying Egypt, is very trifling, and their chance "of penetrating to India scarcely worth conten-"plating," p. 19; though he gives another very curious reason, why this country ought to exhaust itself in defence of the land of Egypt, *ib.* The author of "Reason Why," continues—"In "short, had we followed the author's judgment, we "might have waited till the power of France be-"came so gigantic, and so consolidated, so rich in "resources, so abundant in means," &c. &c. &c. We are then confessedly checking the aggrandisement of France, confining her within proper bounds,

saying,

saying, thus far shalt thou go, but no farther. We certainly do very right to say, thou shalt not come to London, and I hope we shall make our words good; but does this boasted checking accord with the present prospect of the affairs of Europe, or the situation of this country? Does it accord with what we were told in defence of the peace of Amiens, that it was useless to think of reducing the power of France; "that the duty of negociation begins be- "cause all hopes of continental aid are at an "end; to those who wish to continue the war, "for the purpose of *reducing the power of France*, I "I would say, another campaign would cost "£40,000,000, and *certain* success would not be worth such a price."* Yet we have again commenced war for the vain purpose of reducing the power of France, with the idle boast of curbing the insolence, and checking the encroachments of that usurping power, or from the idle apprehension of distant danger, to a remote and scarce approachable colony, without a continental ally, with every advantage of conquest given up, and every opprobrium of breach of faith to contend with. I speak against the impolicy, the necessity of such a war; I plead for peace, for the repose of mankind, against useless effusion of human blood; and I am the advocate

* Vide, Mr. Addington's Speech, Parliamentary Register.

advocate of France, *the French are my Friends*, I am accused of mischievous intent, and wilful misrepresentation.—

With regard to our ultimate demand, I recommended to cast away *prejudice and partiality* (the writer of "Reason Why" sees none, that the author of the "Question" has to cast away, but what are in *favour of the French*), and to consider whether the French may not have some ground for their exclamation,—"Is there, in the records of "history an example of so imperious an *Ultimatum?*" which this writer regards as a very *mild* one.

We had signed an agreement, a solemn compact, to deliver up the island of Malta to the Knights of the Order of St. John of Jerusalem within three months, or sooner, if it could be done, after such signing, *provided* the Order was ready to receive it, according to the arrangements agreed upon in the fourth paragraph, of the tenth article of the Treaty (*vide* Treaty). Certain potentates were named, according to the choice and approval of both the contracting parties, who were to be asked and *invited, after* the Treaty was signed, to engage to guarantee and protect the independence of the island, lest it should hereafter be seized upon by either of the contracting parties, or any other power; but of these potentates, some not choosing to embroil themselves in the future quarrels of the contracting parties, were a long time giving their assent, and others,

others, disapproving of the arrangements, totally refused, unless they could be altered and modified to their satisfaction. We therefore delay the fulfilment of our part of the Treaty, and say to France, "You see it is impracticable to fulfil our agree-" ment relative to the cession of Malta; you in-" sult us, and we perceive plainly, mean to quarrel " with us: we see your intentions, and, in order to ease " our minds respecting your future designs upon " Egypt, we propose that you should let us have per-" petual possession of Malta," p. 51. Holland and Switzerland shall be evacuated by the French troops; " in return you shall have the island of Elba," which you have got, *ibid*; and "we will say, the king of " Etruria, is the king of Etruria; and the Italian " and Ligurian Republics, are *Italian and Ligurian* " *Republics*, p. 52. * "This was surely moderate " enough," says the writer, *ibid*. "When re-" garded

* Our not having said this before, in short our not being willing to acknowledge, as it is called, these newly-established and newly-denominated powers, provoked the Chief Consul to assert, that since we would not notice these Continental states, we had no business with the affairs of the Continent; but his saying so could make no sort of difference as to our real right, or real interference, if inclination or good policy demanded it; he thought himself affronted by our refusal of acknowledgment, and chose to retaliate by his declaration.—I believe this is sometimes included among the objects which we are at war about.

" garded as a satisfaction, and a counterpoise for " the immense continental acquisitions, of France, " a right founded on formal agreement, and which " Talleyrand, even in discussing this very point, " willingly admitted." p. 52. Talleyrand's conversation the reader is referred to. (Official Correspondence, No. 53. The main purport I shall extract. Talleyrand begins by wishing to have the objects which were alleged to have created such uneasiness to the British Government, specified; this Lord Whitworth thinks it better to wave; he could produce what would convince Europe we were in the right, but it was not at that time worth the trouble— " we at last came to the main point of the business, " and on this I cannot say any real progress has " been made. M. de Talleyrand repeated to me, " that the First Consul had nothing more at heart, " than to *avoid the necessity of going to war*, and " that there was no sacrifice he would not make, " short of his honour, to obtain this end; is there, " said M. Talleyrand, no means of satisfying both " parties; for at the same time that the First Consul " insists, and will always insist on the full execution " of the Treaty, he will not object to any mode by " which you may acquire the security you think so " necessary; you are not satisfied with Neapolitan " troops, what others will answer your purpose," &c. " I told him we were losing time, my instructions " were positive—I will confess to your Lordship, " says Lord Whitworth, my motive for consenting " to forward this proposal is, that supposing we

" should

" should find the First Consul as *obstinate* as he now " appears to be on the point of abandoning Malta " to us in perpetuity, and that a temporary posses- " sion would be the next best thing, something of " this kind, might derive from it."—Official Cor- " respondence, No. 53.

Talleyrand's paper was to the following purport: " Every thing which may tend to violate the inde- " pendence of the Order of Malta, will never be con- " sented to by the French government. Every thing " which may tend to put an end to the present diffi- " culties, or be agreeable to the English govern- " ment, and which shall not be contrary to the " Treaty of Amiens, the French government have " no objection to make a particular convention re- " specting it." (Official Correspondence, No. 53.)

Finding it was out of the question to gain a perpetuity, we endeavour to obtain a term of years in Malta; and after much altercation, " Begging them " particularly to recollect that we were in actual pos- " session of the object," send in the ultimatum. viz. that we should have the island of Lampedosa ceded to us, retain Malta till it is ready; Holland to be evacuated, &c. with a *secret* article, that we shall not be required to give up the island of Malta before the expiration of ten years An answer to this in 36 hours.

Not to dispute further about the *mildness* of this ultimatum, I will ask only how far it could be politic for us to make our demand by a *secret* article; a

secret

secret article as our author confesses, p. 55. " To save the honour of France?" Was it not completely acknowledging that the acceptance of our terms would be dishonourable. The Chief Consul had in fact declared, he would never consent to our retention of Malta, in perpetuity, or for a term; that he should prefer the first, as there was an air " of generosity and magnanimity in it;" in the other, " nothing but weakness and the effect of coercion." Official Correspondence, No. 61.

Both Talleyrand and Joseph Buonaparte were both very anxious for peace; and though the idea of a term of years first originated with us, they, I believe, were the first to mention it to Lord Whitworth, in hopes that some arrangements might at last take place, but they never could induce the Chief Consul to hear of it. He might *possibly* argue in this manner: if the English, after signing the most solemn engagement, refuse now, to deliver up the island; what prospect or security shall we have, that they will deliver it up at the expiration of ten years? He therefore would have preferred the appearance of generosity in giving it up altogether; besides that, the idea of submitting to a *secret* article, he might feel somewhat degrading. He was most probably also shrewd enough to perceive the impolicy of the proposal, and that, when publicly known, as it must be, by his refusing compliance, the French nation would be disgusted with the English, for having assumed such an air of superiority, that they would willingly unite around him,

and

and engage in war, convinced of the necessity of it, and that he should likewise have the powers of Europe on his side.

" We have unhappily discovered," says the writer of " Reason Why," p. 56, " that such is the " profligate wickedness of the political creed of the " French government, that a written engagement, " accompanied with every sanctified and ceremonious " formality, is worth no more than the parchment " on which it is engrossed." What do they say, I wonder, of our written engagements, our sanctified and ceremonious formalities ?

" We must therefore look to other securities ; and " since we have been again *compelled* to take up arms " by the insatiable ambition and abandoned perfidy of " the present tyrant of France, I trust that the go- " vernment of this country will give ear to *no terms*, " from whatever quarter they may come, unless they " be such as will, to a certainty, prevent at least, " a *speedy* recurrence to the miseries of war;" *ibid.*— So say our enemies ; thus then is the scabbard thrown away, and we must fight it to the last—

Lay on Macduff,
And curs'd be he who first cries hold, enough !

With such bold defiances from each party, all confidence in treaties and engagements thrown aside, every species of abuse, irritation, taunt, contumely, and reproach, that language can suggest, exhausted against each other, what can be the result, but a deadly exterminating war ? Woe to the nations who

are

are brought into so dreadful a predicament: was this well weighed before we entered into such a war? Are the objects alleged as the causes of it, worth putting the matter to so fearful an issue?

The writer next quotes from the pamphlet, "If "we persist in rejecting all conciliatory project from "Russia, who has marked a disapproval of our con- "duct, what must Europe think of us? How will "the Dutch feel the situation we have brought them "into? The Swiss, the Romans, and the Neapo- "litans?" And the gentleman who is the author of the "Observations," quotes the whole passage, "Have we not lighted a firebrand, and hurled it on "the continent, to consume it with inextinguishable "flame? Are we not the western and tempestuous "blast to drive and urge that flame to the destruction "of the neighbouring states."

I am truly sorry to have excited any feelings of "indignation" in the breast of this gentleman, and to have put him under the painful necessity of suppressing them. I will allow the expression may be strong, say it is too strong; but, as the gentleman seems a man of candour, let us examine how near it comes to the truth. He asks—"What conciliatory "project of Russia have we rejected? or when and "how has that power manifested a disapproval of "our conduct?" I will refer him first to the letter from Russia, suppressed in our Official Correspondence, and found in the Official Correspondence published in London, translated from the French: then

to

to the second part of our Official Correspondence, p. 204, 209. For the disapproval, I will quote from the letter, p. 157, of French Official Correspondence — " Even when Lord Whitworth " delivered his note, a courier from Russia " addressed to the plenipotentiaries of that power " at Paris and at London, by which his Ma- " jesty the Emperor of Russia manifested with *par-* " *ticular energy* the pain that he had felt at learning " the resolution of his British Majesty to keep " Malta, he renewed the assurances of his guarantee, " and declared that he accepted the demand made of " his mediation by the First Consul, if both the " powers would accede to it."

As to the Dutch, they were well aware of the danger of interference (*vide* Mr. Liston's letter, quoted before), by determining upon war; therefore we certainly have been the means of confirming that country, a province to France; there might have been a possibility of something occurring favourable to the Swiss, had not the war been stirred up; the behaviour of the Chief Consul to Switzerland, gave no small share of disgust to many officers and generals of his own army, as is not unknown; had this been left to mature and ripen, it might have given origin to such a state of fermentation and revolt, as might have produced some chance of their emancipation; but the affairs of that unfortunate country are now immerged and forgotten, amidst the variety of new matter. It is too notorious,

rious, that immediately after the commencement of the war, the French overran Italy; and if they have not actually seized upon the territories of the King of Naples, are they not on the confines watching with the English, each who shall snatch them first, kindly to preserve them from falling into the power of the other. How will the pillaged and persecuted Hanoverians feel? Will not these states have some reason to say to us, By your persisting in the retention of Malta, and lighting up again the flame of war, you have set fire to the combustible matter in France; those troops destined for Louisiana and the West, you have driven eastward upon us, while you, rolled up like the hedge-hog in stationary defence, your navy pointing like spines in every direction, remain secure and unassailable.

I should not be surprised to find this blast driving the flame still eastward, through Greece to Constantinople and Egypt, and so being the means of bringing on that very danger, which the war seems particularly to have been undertaken to prevent.

The gentleman then says, he will not dismiss the pamphlet, without animadverting on an incidental expression, p. 14, which appears to him *insidious*. "Accusing the government of *breaking* the Treaty with regard to the Cape of Good Hope," does not this gentleman know that orders were sent in November to retain the Cape; which having been just evacuated according to Treaty, we were obliged to retake, and a capitulation was signed; that orders

were again dispatched for restoring it; in the mean time arrived the news of the surrender to the English forces; then came the message of the 8th of March —Does not this gentleman know that Mr. Moore was sent *secretly*, in October last, furnished with cyphers and decyphers to aid and abett the Swiss, and furnish them privately with arms, ammunition, and provision (Official Correspondence, No. 18). Was this pacific, was this no *breaking* of treaty, or attempt so to do? I shall now, therefore, *after this specimen*, *dismiss* this gentleman and his "observations," *without further notice*.

"Every one has read the Correspondence (says the author of "Reason Why" p. 61), "and setting "apart a few wrong-headed, and I may add *wrong-hearted* individuals, whom no conviction can "reclaim, I have with me not only respecting the "policy, but the *absolute necessity* of the present "war, an united nation."

Every one has *not* read the Correspondence: it is too long, and too complicated for the generality of readers; but those who have, according to this writer, and are not convinced thereby of the *absolute necessity* of the present war, who think and would shew that the provocation from our enemy has not been so violent as is represented; that we have at least rendered him railing for railing, if not insult for insult, would check the current of abuse, and stop the torrents of human blood, are wrong-headed if not wrong-hearted individuals. "It is not an

intricate

" intricate problem (he goes on) wrapped up in " mystery and doubt, requiring any peculiar subtlety " of reason to unravel it;" and yet he writes sixty-four long pages to unravel it.—To answer that simple and *absurd* question " Why do we go to war?—" so palpable—open to the conception of the most " obtuse." He then produces another reason, which he accuses his author of not noticing, " unworthy no doubt of remark." I did indeed think it unworthy of remark; it is " the outrageous indignity, " offered personally by Buonaparte to the British " Ambassador." Official Correspondence, No. 43." He had it seems the audacity to accuse us, in full assembly, of a breach of treaty, which was unfortunately but too true, and exclaimed in a tone somewhat menacing, " Evil be to them who break " their treaties." p. 62. " If such a charge (he proceeds p. 62)†, in such language, could " under any circumstances be justified, no one " can pretend to defend or extenuate it as it " stands; and it is incontrovertibly the most in-" decent dereliction of all ceremony and decorum " upon record."

Merciful Heaven! what will the madness and folly of mankind not arrive at? Is the blood of nations to flow for the *dereliction of all ceremony and decorum?* Is the widow to mourn, and the orphan weep? Are

† " Reason Why."

men to butcher one another in exterminating war, because there has been *a dereliction of all ceremony and decorum?* Because a soldier of fortune,* "*the* "*child of chance*, the son of an obscure family in an "obscure island, whose early life has been passed "in indigence and neglect—the humble agent of "Robespierre—the ferocious executioner of Barras," has usurped the throne of monarchs, and has not behaved with the etiquette, the dignity, and restraint suited to that station, but has been guilty of a *dereliction of all ceremony and decorum* — Is this a wrong-headed or a *wrong-hearted* individual who ventures on this assertion? When Buonaparte was made sensible of the impropriety, he allows an apology was made, and an assurance given that nothing similar should occur again, p. 62; But no: this is no satisfaction—blood, blood must be spilt; blood must wash out the stain: and he then illustrates why, by an instance drawn from a gross insult in private society, and quarrel between two individuals—in short, the apology is an aggravation of the insult!

Are we then reduced to accumulate such instances as these of insult and aggression to make up a mass, a weight of reasons, sufficient to balance the evil, and prove the necessity of the present war?

"But the voice of the nation is with this author, (p. 61.) "If ever a war was just and necessary, and if "ever

* "Reason Why," p. 20.

" ever an opinion of that justice and necessity could " be plainly demonstrated by the general voice of " the nation, in what manner could it more unequi- " vocally be expressed than it has been on the pre- " sent occasion? p. 7." And does the writer imagine that the unanimity displayed in the willing prepa- ration for defence against invasion, is a proof of unanimity as to the policy and necessity of the war?

Why are these questions so frequently, not without seeming artifice, blended together, when they ought to be so widely discriminated! Let us suppose we had ministers extravagant enough, on some idle pretence, to claim of France the city of Calais, or the pro- vinces of Normandy, Tourrain, Anjou and Maine, antiently annexed to the crown of England, and upon refusal were to commence war. The French, in order to revenge so imperious and insolent a demand were to resolve upon our extirpation, if possible, by an overpowering and irresistible invasion—should we not then, even then, at least I hope we should, be as unanimous and resolute to defend ourselves as we are now.

Would not " all ranks and descriptions of people " stand forward in generous emulation manifested in " different ways " &c. " would they not rally round " the throne in active loyalty and patriotic zeal?" When, amidst bustle and alarm, the cause and origin of the war, drowned and forgotten in clamorous preparation, the question were to be asked, Why did

we

we go to war? might it not be answered, Was a question so *absurd ever put to the common sense of the* " *British Empire?* it might as well be asked, *Why do* " *we wish to preserve our privileges and enjoyments as* " *individuals or our independence as a nation?* Are " we not fighting for our lives and our property, our " laws, constitution, and liberty, our existence as an " empire?

Yet who would not reprobate the folly of drawing down upon the nation such calamity by such exorbitant and absurd demands!

I would not be understood to mean that the cases are parallel, or that our ministers have been or are capable of being guilty of such extravagance, but to shew how distinct is the question of unanimity for defence; and unanimity respecting the causes of a war.

It is insisted upon, our enemy was undermining us, that he had secret intentions and hostile views; but this is among the assertions that cloud and puzzle without giving any determinate idea. All the proofs that could possibly be adduced have been brought forward with the most assiduous research, and amount to no cause for an apprehension of immediate danger to ourselves or our distant possessions. He might, from irritation, that increasing irritation he felt againit England, since " every wind that blew from thence brought nothing but hatred and enmity against him," he might, I say, have looked forward to a rupture between the two countries, however impolitic and unwise he was sensible it would be for both parties,

ties, and however unwilling he himself might feel to interrupt the accomplishment of those objects he certainly had *so much at heart* as the re-establishment of his colonies, his navy, and his commerce; he certainly saw and really thought what he declared to Lord Whitworth (Official Correspondence, No. 38.)

"That France with her armies, England with her "fleet (a fleet which he did not think he should be "able to equal in less than ten years), by a proper un- "derstanding, might govern the world, but, *by their* "*strifes might overturn it.* If he had not felt the en- "mity of the British government on every occasion "since the Treaty of Amiens, there would have "been nothing he would not have done to prove his "desire to conciliate; participation in indemnities "as well as in influence on the Continent; treaties "of Commerce; in short, any thing that could have "given satisfaction and have testified his friendship. "Nothing however had been able to conquer the "hatred of the British Government," &c.

I will not say it was not necessary to be prepared, to be upon our guard, in the neighbourhood of a state so enlarged, so enormous, so flushed with conquest, so boasting of success as that of France. Our ministers must have been somnolent indeed to have slumbered, though in time of peace, without a sentinel to watch, arrangements made against surprise. They *suddenly awoke*, it seems (p. 5 †), but they started from their slumbers as from a dream, frightened wish shadows and

† "Reason Why."

and appalled with spectres snatching up the sword to fight the air. I should be glad to know, what other, what worse situation we could ever be in, short of total destruction, upon the most sudden rupture with the enemy, or an immediate declaration of avowed hostility; every exertion is made, and we are threatened with a tremendous and irresistible invasion; we stand upon our guard, and are prepared for the event. I will for once suppose what, I trust, will never happen but though not within the bounds of probability, as it certainly is within those of possibility—I will suppose for a moment, that the projected invasion succeeds, that the event so anxiously desired and looked forward to by our enemy is accomplished—the destruction of Great Britain. We should then be sacrificed—to what? to vague suspicion, to the island of Malta, our alarms for Egypt, and distant apprehensions for our East-Indian Colonies. I trust, however, and have the satisfaction to think, that before so fatal an event could take place, there would be no ministers left to be tormented with a consciousness of error, or opposers to accuse them, but all be buried in one common grave, having fought and died, having sacrificed their lives in defending their country.

I have certainly declared, and it is still my opinion, that should France persist in "her plans respecting Egypt, it would be the worst policy this country could adopt to obstruct them," p. 60. and, with nearly as much earnestness as I should ever wish to perceive unanimity in this country to oppose the hostile invasion of it, should I wish to see it in opposing

posing the expenditure of one penny cost for obtaining the possession of Egypt, or keeping it out of the possession of France. Our perpetual endeavours to prevent this object of jealousy from falling into the hands of the French, would be a constant drain to this country, would lead us incessantly into wars; we should be fighting this phantom whenever we thought it rose to the imagination not only of the present Chief Consul, but to that of any prince or potentate who should be placed at the head of that great Empire. By much bloodshed, contest, and exertion, we might protract for some time their gaining possession of what, when possessed, need not occasion those alarms which so agitate us respectiug our East-Indian territories. The difficulties, the insurmountable difficulties I stated that Buonaparte would have to encounter in getting from Egypt to India, the author calls a *kind of Cretan labyrinth*; it seems indeed a labyrinth which he cannot, nor does he attempt to extricate himself out of, but with the wings of Dædalus escapes all intricacies, flies over seas, over gulphs and desarts, conquers India, and then, in answer to my Quere, whether we should be utterly ruined and undone, even by the loss of India, which I placed at a scarce possible extremity, says, I really think *we should be:* and not, it appears by the loss of that acknowledged source of wealth, but because, we should then surrender our island, the island of Great Britain, the moment the French chose to summon us to do it, p. 59.

The surrendering or preserving the island of Great Britain is not likely to depend upon our possession or loss of the East-Indian colonies; with them or without them, I trust, we shall be able to preserve it. Many have doubted whether we have ever derived any *real* benefit from our Indian territories, I should be sorry to see this country sacrificed for the sake of them.

But we must prepare and look forward to that event which is approaching, which Buonaparte without any peculiar gift of prophecy has announced, the dissolution of the Turkish Empire; it has for some years been tottering, and cannot be long before it falls. It would be most desirable in that case to have the territories divided among as many of the nations of Europe as possible; that Spain, the Venetian and Italian states might come in for a share; but the probability is, that they will be divided between the more powerful sovereigns of Russia, Austria, and France, who will unquestionably join in wishes and endeavours to expel us, as intruders, from the Mediterranean, and exclude us from any possessions there. If we then survey the extent of coast that surrounds that sea, and consider the numberless harbours and bays that will be in the occupation of our enemies, what exertions, what expences and difficulties would not be necessary to this country in maintaining a station there; would there be a possibility of doing it? and what benefits could balance so enormous and exhausting a drain? The Mediterranean would be a bottomless pit to swallow up the seamen and treasure

of

of this island. While we were attacked in the Mediterranean by the then great naval powers of Austria, Russia, and France, we might be assailed at home by these powers united, or by France alone from her endlessly extended coast.

The preserving a station in the Mediterranean has of late, by most politicians, been reckoned to induce more expence than it is worth; by not having one, we should deprive our enemies of a point union, and leave them to dispute about the partition among themselves, and there would then be at least one part of the world where our enemies would be contending, without our insisting upon partaking in the broil; in peace we might enjoy the advantage of some trade, in war we should avoid much difficulty.

On these various, accounts resigning all pretensions to a possession in the Mediterranean, were I to suggest the idea of a basis upon which to form a treaty of peace, whenever there is a chance of Europe being once more blessed with such an event, it should be upon the following plan, which might be extended or contracted as circumstances should warrant.

Malta to be surrendered, given up to the Maltese inhabitants—King of Etruria and Italian Republics to be acknowledged—the King of Sardinia to be provided for—Switzerland to be evacuated by the French, Hanover restored and the damages compensated, Holland to be emancipated, the French troops to be withdrawn as soon as possible, and every security that can be obtained, taken for its independence—the Netherlands

lands to be made a separate state, under the dominion of the king of Prussia, or the prince of Orange, or to become a distinct Republic under whatever form of government the inhabitants may choose—Gibraltar to be disposed of to the Spaniards, in order to defray the expences of the war—and thus turn the key on the closet of discord, shut the gates of that amphitheatre, that vast Naumachia, where we should consume our strength in vain exertions for the amusement of surrounding spectators.

But whether this tremendous war is to be concluded by these or any other means, I am happy to be able in something to join my opponent (author of "the Reason Why," p. 55), and that is, in wishing with equal ardency that it may be *soon* concluded.

THE END.

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